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https://github.com/rocky-linux/peridot.git
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ad0f7a5305
Upgrade to Go 1.20.5, Hydra v2 SDK, rules-go v0.44.2 (with proper resolves), protobuf v25.3 and mass upgrade of Go dependencies.
803 lines
26 KiB
Go
803 lines
26 KiB
Go
// Copyright 2011 The Go Authors. All rights reserved.
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// Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style
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// license that can be found in the LICENSE file.
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package ssh
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import (
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"bytes"
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"errors"
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"fmt"
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"io"
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"net"
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"strings"
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)
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// The Permissions type holds fine-grained permissions that are
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// specific to a user or a specific authentication method for a user.
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// The Permissions value for a successful authentication attempt is
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// available in ServerConn, so it can be used to pass information from
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// the user-authentication phase to the application layer.
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type Permissions struct {
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// CriticalOptions indicate restrictions to the default
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// permissions, and are typically used in conjunction with
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// user certificates. The standard for SSH certificates
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// defines "force-command" (only allow the given command to
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// execute) and "source-address" (only allow connections from
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// the given address). The SSH package currently only enforces
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// the "source-address" critical option. It is up to server
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// implementations to enforce other critical options, such as
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// "force-command", by checking them after the SSH handshake
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// is successful. In general, SSH servers should reject
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// connections that specify critical options that are unknown
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// or not supported.
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CriticalOptions map[string]string
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// Extensions are extra functionality that the server may
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// offer on authenticated connections. Lack of support for an
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// extension does not preclude authenticating a user. Common
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// extensions are "permit-agent-forwarding",
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// "permit-X11-forwarding". The Go SSH library currently does
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// not act on any extension, and it is up to server
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// implementations to honor them. Extensions can be used to
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// pass data from the authentication callbacks to the server
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// application layer.
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Extensions map[string]string
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}
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type GSSAPIWithMICConfig struct {
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// AllowLogin, must be set, is called when gssapi-with-mic
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// authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3). The srcName is from the
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// results of the GSS-API authentication. The format is username@DOMAIN.
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// GSSAPI just guarantees to the server who the user is, but not if they can log in, and with what permissions.
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// This callback is called after the user identity is established with GSSAPI to decide if the user can login with
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// which permissions. If the user is allowed to login, it should return a nil error.
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AllowLogin func(conn ConnMetadata, srcName string) (*Permissions, error)
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// Server must be set. It's the implementation
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// of the GSSAPIServer interface. See GSSAPIServer interface for details.
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Server GSSAPIServer
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}
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// ServerConfig holds server specific configuration data.
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type ServerConfig struct {
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// Config contains configuration shared between client and server.
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Config
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// PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms specifies the supported client public key
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// authentication algorithms. Note that this should not include certificate
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// types since those use the underlying algorithm. This list is sent to the
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// client if it supports the server-sig-algs extension. Order is irrelevant.
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// If unspecified then a default set of algorithms is used.
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PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms []string
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hostKeys []Signer
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// NoClientAuth is true if clients are allowed to connect without
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// authenticating.
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// To determine NoClientAuth at runtime, set NoClientAuth to true
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// and the optional NoClientAuthCallback to a non-nil value.
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NoClientAuth bool
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// NoClientAuthCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user
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// attempts to authenticate with auth method "none".
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// NoClientAuth must also be set to true for this be used, or
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// this func is unused.
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NoClientAuthCallback func(ConnMetadata) (*Permissions, error)
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// MaxAuthTries specifies the maximum number of authentication attempts
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// permitted per connection. If set to a negative number, the number of
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// attempts are unlimited. If set to zero, the number of attempts are limited
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// to 6.
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MaxAuthTries int
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// PasswordCallback, if non-nil, is called when a user
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// attempts to authenticate using a password.
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PasswordCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, password []byte) (*Permissions, error)
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// PublicKeyCallback, if non-nil, is called when a client
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// offers a public key for authentication. It must return a nil error
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// if the given public key can be used to authenticate the
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// given user. For example, see CertChecker.Authenticate. A
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// call to this function does not guarantee that the key
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// offered is in fact used to authenticate. To record any data
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// depending on the public key, store it inside a
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// Permissions.Extensions entry.
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PublicKeyCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, key PublicKey) (*Permissions, error)
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// KeyboardInteractiveCallback, if non-nil, is called when
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// keyboard-interactive authentication is selected (RFC
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// 4256). The client object's Challenge function should be
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// used to query the user. The callback may offer multiple
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// Challenge rounds. To avoid information leaks, the client
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// should be presented a challenge even if the user is
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// unknown.
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KeyboardInteractiveCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, client KeyboardInteractiveChallenge) (*Permissions, error)
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// AuthLogCallback, if non-nil, is called to log all authentication
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// attempts.
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AuthLogCallback func(conn ConnMetadata, method string, err error)
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// ServerVersion is the version identification string to announce in
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// the public handshake.
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// If empty, a reasonable default is used.
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// Note that RFC 4253 section 4.2 requires that this string start with
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// "SSH-2.0-".
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ServerVersion string
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// BannerCallback, if present, is called and the return string is sent to
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// the client after key exchange completed but before authentication.
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BannerCallback func(conn ConnMetadata) string
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// GSSAPIWithMICConfig includes gssapi server and callback, which if both non-nil, is used
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// when gssapi-with-mic authentication is selected (RFC 4462 section 3).
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GSSAPIWithMICConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig
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}
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// AddHostKey adds a private key as a host key. If an existing host
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// key exists with the same public key format, it is replaced. Each server
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// config must have at least one host key.
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func (s *ServerConfig) AddHostKey(key Signer) {
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for i, k := range s.hostKeys {
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if k.PublicKey().Type() == key.PublicKey().Type() {
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s.hostKeys[i] = key
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return
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}
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}
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s.hostKeys = append(s.hostKeys, key)
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}
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// cachedPubKey contains the results of querying whether a public key is
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// acceptable for a user.
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type cachedPubKey struct {
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user string
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pubKeyData []byte
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result error
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perms *Permissions
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}
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const maxCachedPubKeys = 16
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// pubKeyCache caches tests for public keys. Since SSH clients
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// will query whether a public key is acceptable before attempting to
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// authenticate with it, we end up with duplicate queries for public
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// key validity. The cache only applies to a single ServerConn.
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type pubKeyCache struct {
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keys []cachedPubKey
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}
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// get returns the result for a given user/algo/key tuple.
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func (c *pubKeyCache) get(user string, pubKeyData []byte) (cachedPubKey, bool) {
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for _, k := range c.keys {
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if k.user == user && bytes.Equal(k.pubKeyData, pubKeyData) {
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return k, true
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}
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}
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return cachedPubKey{}, false
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}
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// add adds the given tuple to the cache.
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func (c *pubKeyCache) add(candidate cachedPubKey) {
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if len(c.keys) < maxCachedPubKeys {
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c.keys = append(c.keys, candidate)
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}
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}
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// ServerConn is an authenticated SSH connection, as seen from the
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// server
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type ServerConn struct {
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Conn
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// If the succeeding authentication callback returned a
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// non-nil Permissions pointer, it is stored here.
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Permissions *Permissions
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}
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// NewServerConn starts a new SSH server with c as the underlying
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// transport. It starts with a handshake and, if the handshake is
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// unsuccessful, it closes the connection and returns an error. The
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// Request and NewChannel channels must be serviced, or the connection
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// will hang.
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//
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// The returned error may be of type *ServerAuthError for
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// authentication errors.
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func NewServerConn(c net.Conn, config *ServerConfig) (*ServerConn, <-chan NewChannel, <-chan *Request, error) {
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fullConf := *config
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fullConf.SetDefaults()
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if fullConf.MaxAuthTries == 0 {
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fullConf.MaxAuthTries = 6
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}
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if len(fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms) == 0 {
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fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms = supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos
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} else {
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for _, algo := range fullConf.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms {
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if !contains(supportedPubKeyAuthAlgos, algo) {
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c.Close()
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return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported public key authentication algorithm %s", algo)
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}
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}
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}
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// Check if the config contains any unsupported key exchanges
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for _, kex := range fullConf.KeyExchanges {
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if _, ok := serverForbiddenKexAlgos[kex]; ok {
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c.Close()
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return nil, nil, nil, fmt.Errorf("ssh: unsupported key exchange %s for server", kex)
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}
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}
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s := &connection{
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sshConn: sshConn{conn: c},
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}
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perms, err := s.serverHandshake(&fullConf)
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if err != nil {
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c.Close()
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return nil, nil, nil, err
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}
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return &ServerConn{s, perms}, s.mux.incomingChannels, s.mux.incomingRequests, nil
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}
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// signAndMarshal signs the data with the appropriate algorithm,
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// and serializes the result in SSH wire format. algo is the negotiate
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// algorithm and may be a certificate type.
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func signAndMarshal(k AlgorithmSigner, rand io.Reader, data []byte, algo string) ([]byte, error) {
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sig, err := k.SignWithAlgorithm(rand, data, underlyingAlgo(algo))
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return Marshal(sig), nil
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}
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// handshake performs key exchange and user authentication.
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func (s *connection) serverHandshake(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
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if len(config.hostKeys) == 0 {
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return nil, errors.New("ssh: server has no host keys")
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}
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if !config.NoClientAuth && config.PasswordCallback == nil && config.PublicKeyCallback == nil &&
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config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil && (config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil ||
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config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin == nil || config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server == nil) {
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return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
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}
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if config.ServerVersion != "" {
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s.serverVersion = []byte(config.ServerVersion)
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} else {
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s.serverVersion = []byte(packageVersion)
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}
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var err error
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s.clientVersion, err = exchangeVersions(s.sshConn.conn, s.serverVersion)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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tr := newTransport(s.sshConn.conn, config.Rand, false /* not client */)
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s.transport = newServerTransport(tr, s.clientVersion, s.serverVersion, config)
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if err := s.transport.waitSession(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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// We just did the key change, so the session ID is established.
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s.sessionID = s.transport.getSessionID()
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var packet []byte
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if packet, err = s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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var serviceRequest serviceRequestMsg
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if err = Unmarshal(packet, &serviceRequest); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if serviceRequest.Service != serviceUserAuth {
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return nil, errors.New("ssh: requested service '" + serviceRequest.Service + "' before authenticating")
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}
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serviceAccept := serviceAcceptMsg{
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Service: serviceUserAuth,
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}
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if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&serviceAccept)); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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perms, err := s.serverAuthenticate(config)
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if err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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s.mux = newMux(s.transport)
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return perms, err
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}
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func checkSourceAddress(addr net.Addr, sourceAddrs string) error {
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if addr == nil {
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return errors.New("ssh: no address known for client, but source-address match required")
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}
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tcpAddr, ok := addr.(*net.TCPAddr)
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if !ok {
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return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not an TCP address when checking source-address match", addr)
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}
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for _, sourceAddr := range strings.Split(sourceAddrs, ",") {
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if allowedIP := net.ParseIP(sourceAddr); allowedIP != nil {
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if allowedIP.Equal(tcpAddr.IP) {
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return nil
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}
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} else {
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_, ipNet, err := net.ParseCIDR(sourceAddr)
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if err != nil {
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return fmt.Errorf("ssh: error parsing source-address restriction %q: %v", sourceAddr, err)
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}
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if ipNet.Contains(tcpAddr.IP) {
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return nil
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}
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}
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}
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return fmt.Errorf("ssh: remote address %v is not allowed because of source-address restriction", addr)
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}
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func gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig *GSSAPIWithMICConfig, token []byte, s *connection,
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sessionID []byte, userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg) (authErr error, perms *Permissions, err error) {
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gssAPIServer := gssapiConfig.Server
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defer gssAPIServer.DeleteSecContext()
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var srcName string
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for {
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var (
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outToken []byte
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needContinue bool
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)
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outToken, srcName, needContinue, err = gssAPIServer.AcceptSecContext(token)
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if err != nil {
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return err, nil, nil
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}
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if len(outToken) != 0 {
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if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIToken{
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Token: outToken,
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})); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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}
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if !needContinue {
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break
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}
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packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
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if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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token = userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token
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}
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packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
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if err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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userAuthGSSAPIMICReq := &userAuthGSSAPIMIC{}
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if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq); err != nil {
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return nil, nil, err
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}
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mic := buildMIC(string(sessionID), userAuthReq.User, userAuthReq.Service, userAuthReq.Method)
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if err := gssAPIServer.VerifyMIC(mic, userAuthGSSAPIMICReq.MIC); err != nil {
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return err, nil, nil
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}
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perms, authErr = gssapiConfig.AllowLogin(s, srcName)
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return authErr, perms, nil
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}
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// isAlgoCompatible checks if the signature format is compatible with the
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// selected algorithm taking into account edge cases that occur with old
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// clients.
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func isAlgoCompatible(algo, sigFormat string) bool {
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// Compatibility for old clients.
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//
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// For certificate authentication with OpenSSH 7.2-7.7 signature format can
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// be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512 for the algorithm
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// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com.
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//
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// With gpg-agent < 2.2.6 the algorithm can be rsa-sha2-256 or rsa-sha2-512
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// for signature format ssh-rsa.
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if isRSA(algo) && isRSA(sigFormat) {
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return true
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}
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// Standard case: the underlying algorithm must match the signature format.
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return underlyingAlgo(algo) == sigFormat
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}
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// ServerAuthError represents server authentication errors and is
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// sometimes returned by NewServerConn. It appends any authentication
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// errors that may occur, and is returned if all of the authentication
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// methods provided by the user failed to authenticate.
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type ServerAuthError struct {
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// Errors contains authentication errors returned by the authentication
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// callback methods. The first entry is typically ErrNoAuth.
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Errors []error
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}
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func (l ServerAuthError) Error() string {
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var errs []string
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for _, err := range l.Errors {
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errs = append(errs, err.Error())
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}
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return "[" + strings.Join(errs, ", ") + "]"
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}
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// ErrNoAuth is the error value returned if no
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// authentication method has been passed yet. This happens as a normal
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// part of the authentication loop, since the client first tries
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// 'none' authentication to discover available methods.
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// It is returned in ServerAuthError.Errors from NewServerConn.
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var ErrNoAuth = errors.New("ssh: no auth passed yet")
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func (s *connection) serverAuthenticate(config *ServerConfig) (*Permissions, error) {
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sessionID := s.transport.getSessionID()
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var cache pubKeyCache
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var perms *Permissions
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authFailures := 0
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var authErrs []error
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var displayedBanner bool
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userAuthLoop:
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for {
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if authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries && config.MaxAuthTries > 0 {
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discMsg := &disconnectMsg{
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Reason: 2,
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Message: "too many authentication failures",
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}
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if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(discMsg)); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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return nil, discMsg
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}
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var userAuthReq userAuthRequestMsg
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if packet, err := s.transport.readPacket(); err != nil {
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if err == io.EOF {
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return nil, &ServerAuthError{Errors: authErrs}
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}
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return nil, err
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} else if err = Unmarshal(packet, &userAuthReq); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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if userAuthReq.Service != serviceSSH {
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return nil, errors.New("ssh: client attempted to negotiate for unknown service: " + userAuthReq.Service)
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}
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s.user = userAuthReq.User
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if !displayedBanner && config.BannerCallback != nil {
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displayedBanner = true
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msg := config.BannerCallback(s)
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if msg != "" {
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bannerMsg := &userAuthBannerMsg{
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Message: msg,
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}
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if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(bannerMsg)); err != nil {
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return nil, err
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}
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}
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}
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perms = nil
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authErr := ErrNoAuth
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switch userAuthReq.Method {
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case "none":
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if config.NoClientAuth {
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if config.NoClientAuthCallback != nil {
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perms, authErr = config.NoClientAuthCallback(s)
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} else {
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authErr = nil
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}
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}
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// allow initial attempt of 'none' without penalty
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if authFailures == 0 {
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authFailures--
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}
|
|
case "password":
|
|
if config.PasswordCallback == nil {
|
|
authErr = errors.New("ssh: password auth not configured")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
|
|
if len(payload) < 1 || payload[0] != 0 {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
payload = payload[1:]
|
|
password, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
|
|
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
perms, authErr = config.PasswordCallback(s, password)
|
|
case "keyboard-interactive":
|
|
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback == nil {
|
|
authErr = errors.New("ssh: keyboard-interactive auth not configured")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
prompter := &sshClientKeyboardInteractive{s}
|
|
perms, authErr = config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback(s, prompter.Challenge)
|
|
case "publickey":
|
|
if config.PublicKeyCallback == nil {
|
|
authErr = errors.New("ssh: publickey auth not configured")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
payload := userAuthReq.Payload
|
|
if len(payload) < 1 {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
isQuery := payload[0] == 0
|
|
payload = payload[1:]
|
|
algoBytes, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
algo := string(algoBytes)
|
|
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, underlyingAlgo(algo)) {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", algo)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pubKeyData, payload, ok := parseString(payload)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
pubKey, err := ParsePublicKey(pubKeyData)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
candidate, ok := cache.get(s.user, pubKeyData)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
candidate.user = s.user
|
|
candidate.pubKeyData = pubKeyData
|
|
candidate.perms, candidate.result = config.PublicKeyCallback(s, pubKey)
|
|
if candidate.result == nil && candidate.perms != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions != nil && candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption] != "" {
|
|
candidate.result = checkSourceAddress(
|
|
s.RemoteAddr(),
|
|
candidate.perms.CriticalOptions[sourceAddressCriticalOption])
|
|
}
|
|
cache.add(candidate)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if isQuery {
|
|
// The client can query if the given public key
|
|
// would be okay.
|
|
|
|
if len(payload) > 0 {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if candidate.result == nil {
|
|
okMsg := userAuthPubKeyOkMsg{
|
|
Algo: algo,
|
|
PubKey: pubKeyData,
|
|
}
|
|
if err = s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&okMsg)); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
continue userAuthLoop
|
|
}
|
|
authErr = candidate.result
|
|
} else {
|
|
sig, payload, ok := parseSignature(payload)
|
|
if !ok || len(payload) > 0 {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
// Ensure the declared public key algo is compatible with the
|
|
// decoded one. This check will ensure we don't accept e.g.
|
|
// ssh-rsa-cert-v01@openssh.com algorithm with ssh-rsa public
|
|
// key type. The algorithm and public key type must be
|
|
// consistent: both must be certificate algorithms, or neither.
|
|
if !contains(algorithmsForKeyFormat(pubKey.Type()), algo) {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: public key type %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q",
|
|
pubKey.Type(), algo)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
// Ensure the public key algo and signature algo
|
|
// are supported. Compare the private key
|
|
// algorithm name that corresponds to algo with
|
|
// sig.Format. This is usually the same, but
|
|
// for certs, the names differ.
|
|
if !contains(config.PublicKeyAuthAlgorithms, sig.Format) {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: algorithm %q not accepted", sig.Format)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
if !isAlgoCompatible(algo, sig.Format) {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: signature %q not compatible with selected algorithm %q", sig.Format, algo)
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
signedData := buildDataSignedForAuth(sessionID, userAuthReq, algo, pubKeyData)
|
|
|
|
if err := pubKey.Verify(signedData, sig); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authErr = candidate.result
|
|
perms = candidate.perms
|
|
}
|
|
case "gssapi-with-mic":
|
|
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig == nil {
|
|
authErr = errors.New("ssh: gssapi-with-mic auth not configured")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
gssapiConfig := config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig
|
|
userAuthRequestGSSAPI, err := parseGSSAPIPayload(userAuthReq.Payload)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthRequest)
|
|
}
|
|
// OpenSSH supports Kerberos V5 mechanism only for GSS-API authentication.
|
|
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N == 0 {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: Mechanism negotiation is not supported")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
var i uint32
|
|
present := false
|
|
for i = 0; i < userAuthRequestGSSAPI.N; i++ {
|
|
if userAuthRequestGSSAPI.OIDS[i].Equal(krb5Mesh) {
|
|
present = true
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
if !present {
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: GSSAPI authentication must use the Kerberos V5 mechanism")
|
|
break
|
|
}
|
|
// Initial server response, see RFC 4462 section 3.3.
|
|
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthGSSAPIResponse{
|
|
SupportMech: krb5OID,
|
|
})); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
// Exchange token, see RFC 4462 section 3.4.
|
|
packet, err := s.transport.readPacket()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
userAuthGSSAPITokenReq := &userAuthGSSAPIToken{}
|
|
if err := Unmarshal(packet, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
authErr, perms, err = gssExchangeToken(gssapiConfig, userAuthGSSAPITokenReq.Token, s, sessionID,
|
|
userAuthReq)
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
default:
|
|
authErr = fmt.Errorf("ssh: unknown method %q", userAuthReq.Method)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authErrs = append(authErrs, authErr)
|
|
|
|
if config.AuthLogCallback != nil {
|
|
config.AuthLogCallback(s, userAuthReq.Method, authErr)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if authErr == nil {
|
|
break userAuthLoop
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
authFailures++
|
|
if config.MaxAuthTries > 0 && authFailures >= config.MaxAuthTries {
|
|
// If we have hit the max attempts, don't bother sending the
|
|
// final SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE message, since there are
|
|
// no more authentication methods which can be attempted,
|
|
// and this message may cause the client to re-attempt
|
|
// authentication while we send the disconnect message.
|
|
// Continue, and trigger the disconnect at the start of
|
|
// the loop.
|
|
//
|
|
// The SSH specification is somewhat confusing about this,
|
|
// RFC 4252 Section 5.1 requires each authentication failure
|
|
// be responded to with a respective SSH_MSG_USERAUTH_FAILURE
|
|
// message, but Section 4 says the server should disconnect
|
|
// after some number of attempts, but it isn't explicit which
|
|
// message should take precedence (i.e. should there be a failure
|
|
// message than a disconnect message, or if we are going to
|
|
// disconnect, should we only send that message.)
|
|
//
|
|
// Either way, OpenSSH disconnects immediately after the last
|
|
// failed authnetication attempt, and given they are typically
|
|
// considered the golden implementation it seems reasonable
|
|
// to match that behavior.
|
|
continue
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var failureMsg userAuthFailureMsg
|
|
if config.PasswordCallback != nil {
|
|
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "password")
|
|
}
|
|
if config.PublicKeyCallback != nil {
|
|
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "publickey")
|
|
}
|
|
if config.KeyboardInteractiveCallback != nil {
|
|
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "keyboard-interactive")
|
|
}
|
|
if config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig != nil && config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.Server != nil &&
|
|
config.GSSAPIWithMICConfig.AllowLogin != nil {
|
|
failureMsg.Methods = append(failureMsg.Methods, "gssapi-with-mic")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if len(failureMsg.Methods) == 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("ssh: no authentication methods configured but NoClientAuth is also false")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&failureMsg)); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := s.transport.writePacket([]byte{msgUserAuthSuccess}); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
return perms, nil
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
// sshClientKeyboardInteractive implements a ClientKeyboardInteractive by
|
|
// asking the client on the other side of a ServerConn.
|
|
type sshClientKeyboardInteractive struct {
|
|
*connection
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
func (c *sshClientKeyboardInteractive) Challenge(name, instruction string, questions []string, echos []bool) (answers []string, err error) {
|
|
if len(questions) != len(echos) {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("ssh: echos and questions must have equal length")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
var prompts []byte
|
|
for i := range questions {
|
|
prompts = appendString(prompts, questions[i])
|
|
prompts = appendBool(prompts, echos[i])
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
if err := c.transport.writePacket(Marshal(&userAuthInfoRequestMsg{
|
|
Name: name,
|
|
Instruction: instruction,
|
|
NumPrompts: uint32(len(questions)),
|
|
Prompts: prompts,
|
|
})); err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
packet, err := c.transport.readPacket()
|
|
if err != nil {
|
|
return nil, err
|
|
}
|
|
if packet[0] != msgUserAuthInfoResponse {
|
|
return nil, unexpectedMessageError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse, packet[0])
|
|
}
|
|
packet = packet[1:]
|
|
|
|
n, packet, ok := parseUint32(packet)
|
|
if !ok || int(n) != len(questions) {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
for i := uint32(0); i < n; i++ {
|
|
ans, rest, ok := parseString(packet)
|
|
if !ok {
|
|
return nil, parseError(msgUserAuthInfoResponse)
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
answers = append(answers, string(ans))
|
|
packet = rest
|
|
}
|
|
if len(packet) != 0 {
|
|
return nil, errors.New("ssh: junk at end of message")
|
|
}
|
|
|
|
return answers, nil
|
|
}
|