75 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
75 lines
2.8 KiB
Plaintext
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#!/bin/bash
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if [ ${DIB_DEBUG_TRACE:-1} -gt 0 ]; then
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set -x
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fi
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set -eu
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set -o pipefail
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# parser isn't smart enough to figure out \
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# dib-lint: disable=safe_sudo
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# Here be dragons ... a previous dragon slayer helpfully pointed out in
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# http://www.spinics.net/lists/selinux/msg17379.html
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#
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# Not all of the contexts defined by the offline system's
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# file_contexts may be valid under the policy of the host on which
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# you are running (e.g. if they run different distributions or even
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# different releases of the same distribution), which will normally
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# prevent setting those contexts (the kernel won't recognize them).
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# If you have this issue, you'll need to run setfiles as root in a
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# special domain, setfiles_mac_t, that is allowed to set contexts
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# unknown to the host policy, and likely chrooted so that it doesn't
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# ask the kernel whether the contexts are valid via
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# /sys/fs/selinux/context. That is how livecd-creator supported
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# creating images for other releases.
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# One issue you might see without fixing selinux file labels is sshd
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# will run in the kernel_t domain instead of the sshd_t domain, making
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# ssh connections fail with "Unable to get valid context for <user>"
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# error message. Other failures will occur too.
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# XXX: is it really valid to build rpm-distros without this?
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if [[ ! -f ${TARGET_ROOT}/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts ]]; then
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echo "No selinux policy found in chroot, skipping..."
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exit 0
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fi
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if [[ ! -x ${TARGET_ROOT}/usr/sbin/setfiles ]]; then
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echo "Can not find setfiles in chroot!"
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exit 1
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fi
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# If we're on a selinux system, enable permissive mode for
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# setfiles_mac_t so we can relabel within the chroot without concern
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# for whatever policy is in the host kernel. We will run under
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# "runcon" to specifically allow this
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_runcon=""
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if [[ -x /usr/sbin/semanage ]]; then
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sudo semanage permissive -a setfiles_mac_t
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_runcon="runcon -t setfiles_mac_t -- "
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fi
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# setfiles in > Fedora 26 added this flag:
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# do not read /proc/mounts to obtain a list of
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# non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from relabeling
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# checks. Setting this option is useful where there is
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# a non-seclabel fs mounted with a seclabel fs
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# this describes our situation of being on a loopback device on
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# an ubuntu system, say. See also
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# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1472709
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_dash_m=""
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if [[ $DISTRO_NAME == "fedora" && $DIB_RELEASE -ge 26 ]]; then
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_dash_m+="-m"
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fi
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IFS='|' read -ra SPLIT_MOUNTS <<< "$DIB_MOUNTPOINTS"
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for MOUNTPOINT in "${SPLIT_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
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if [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/tmp/in_target.d" ] && [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/dev" ]; then
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sudo ${_runcon} chroot ${TARGET_ROOT} \
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/usr/sbin/setfiles -F ${_dash_m} \
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/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts ${MOUNTPOINT}
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fi
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done
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