Merge "Move setfiles to outside chroot with runcon"
This commit is contained in:
commit
a6da39acb8
@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ if [ $DISTRO_NAME = 'fedora' ] ; then
|
||||
install-packages -e kernel-debug-devel gcc fedora-logos \
|
||||
rsync pykickstart \
|
||||
make genisoimage tcpdump \
|
||||
man-db policycoreutils kbd-misc \
|
||||
man-db kbd-misc \
|
||||
plymouth cronie ${_remove_yum}
|
||||
|
||||
${YUM:-yum} clean all
|
||||
|
74
diskimage_builder/elements/rpm-distro/cleanup.d/99-selinux-fixfiles-restore
Executable file
74
diskimage_builder/elements/rpm-distro/cleanup.d/99-selinux-fixfiles-restore
Executable file
@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ${DIB_DEBUG_TRACE:-1} -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
fi
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
set -o pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
# parser isn't smart enough to figure out \
|
||||
# dib-lint: disable=safe_sudo
|
||||
|
||||
# Here be dragons ... a previous dragon slayer helpfully pointed out in
|
||||
# http://www.spinics.net/lists/selinux/msg17379.html
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Not all of the contexts defined by the offline system's
|
||||
# file_contexts may be valid under the policy of the host on which
|
||||
# you are running (e.g. if they run different distributions or even
|
||||
# different releases of the same distribution), which will normally
|
||||
# prevent setting those contexts (the kernel won't recognize them).
|
||||
# If you have this issue, you'll need to run setfiles as root in a
|
||||
# special domain, setfiles_mac_t, that is allowed to set contexts
|
||||
# unknown to the host policy, and likely chrooted so that it doesn't
|
||||
# ask the kernel whether the contexts are valid via
|
||||
# /sys/fs/selinux/context. That is how livecd-creator supported
|
||||
# creating images for other releases.
|
||||
|
||||
# One issue you might see without fixing selinux file labels is sshd
|
||||
# will run in the kernel_t domain instead of the sshd_t domain, making
|
||||
# ssh connections fail with "Unable to get valid context for <user>"
|
||||
# error message. Other failures will occur too.
|
||||
|
||||
# XXX: is it really valid to build rpm-distros without this?
|
||||
if [[ ! -f ${TARGET_ROOT}/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts ]]; then
|
||||
echo "No selinux policy found in chroot, skipping..."
|
||||
exit 0
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
if [[ ! -x ${TARGET_ROOT}/usr/sbin/setfiles ]]; then
|
||||
echo "Can not find setfiles in chroot!"
|
||||
exit 1
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# If we're on a selinux system, enable permissive mode for
|
||||
# setfiles_mac_t so we can relabel within the chroot without concern
|
||||
# for whatever policy is in the host kernel. We will run under
|
||||
# "runcon" to specifically allow this
|
||||
_runcon=""
|
||||
if [[ -x /usr/sbin/semanage ]]; then
|
||||
sudo semanage permissive -a setfiles_mac_t
|
||||
_runcon="runcon -t setfiles_mac_t -- "
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
# setfiles in > Fedora 26 added this flag:
|
||||
# do not read /proc/mounts to obtain a list of
|
||||
# non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from relabeling
|
||||
# checks. Setting this option is useful where there is
|
||||
# a non-seclabel fs mounted with a seclabel fs
|
||||
# this describes our situation of being on a loopback device on
|
||||
# an ubuntu system, say. See also
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1472709
|
||||
_dash_m=""
|
||||
if [[ $DISTRO_NAME == "fedora" && $DIB_RELEASE -ge 26 ]]; then
|
||||
_dash_m+="-m"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
IFS='|' read -ra SPLIT_MOUNTS <<< "$DIB_MOUNTPOINTS"
|
||||
for MOUNTPOINT in "${SPLIT_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
|
||||
if [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/tmp/in_target.d" ] && [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/dev" ]; then
|
||||
sudo ${_runcon} chroot ${TARGET_ROOT} \
|
||||
/usr/sbin/setfiles -F ${_dash_m} \
|
||||
/etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts ${MOUNTPOINT}
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
|
@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
|
||||
#!/bin/bash
|
||||
|
||||
if [ ${DIB_DEBUG_TRACE:-1} -gt 0 ]; then
|
||||
set -x
|
||||
fi
|
||||
set -eu
|
||||
set -o pipefail
|
||||
|
||||
SETFILES=$(type -p setfiles || true)
|
||||
if [ -e /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts -a -x "${SETFILES}" ]; then
|
||||
# get all mounpoints in the system
|
||||
IFS='|' read -ra SPLIT_MOUNTS <<< "$DIB_MOUNTPOINTS"
|
||||
for MOUNTPOINT in "${SPLIT_MOUNTS[@]}"; do
|
||||
# Without fixing selinux file labels, sshd will run in the kernel_t domain
|
||||
# instead of the sshd_t domain, making ssh connections fail with
|
||||
# "Unable to get valid context for <user>" error message
|
||||
if [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/tmp/in_target.d" ] && [ "${MOUNTPOINT}" != "/dev" ]; then
|
||||
# setfiles in > Fedora 26 added this flag:
|
||||
# do not read /proc/mounts to obtain a list of
|
||||
# non-seclabel mounts to be excluded from relabeling
|
||||
# checks. Setting this option is useful where there is
|
||||
# a non-seclabel fs mounted with a seclabel fs
|
||||
# this describes our situation of being on a loopback device on
|
||||
# an ubuntu system, say. See also
|
||||
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1472709
|
||||
_dash_m=""
|
||||
if [[ $DISTRO_NAME == "fedora" && $DIB_RELEASE -ge 26 ]]; then
|
||||
_dash_m+="-m"
|
||||
fi
|
||||
$SETFILES ${_dash_m} /etc/selinux/targeted/contexts/files/file_contexts ${MOUNTPOINT}
|
||||
fi
|
||||
done
|
||||
else
|
||||
echo "Skipping SELinux relabel, since setfiles is not available."
|
||||
echo "Touching /.autorelabel to schedule a relabel when the image boots."
|
||||
touch /.autorelabel
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user